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I. lN1RODUCTION

Family limited partnerships have been popular gift and estate
tax planning vehicles for many years.) In recent years, family limited liability companies (LLCs) have also become common, particularly in those states that have updated their statutes to take the
check-the-box regulations into account. LLCs with more than one
member are usually classified as partnerships for federal income tax
purposes. 2 In a typical structure, when there is adequate planning,
the donors form a limited partnership or an LLC Uointly, "family
limited liability entity" or FLLE) , to which they contribute assets
expected to appreciate in value. 3 The contribution is typically taxFor a sampling of the available literature, relatively little of which is in
traditional law reviews, see Edward D. Brown, Maximizing Minority Discounts
for Limited Partnerships in an Integrated Estate Plan, 93 1. TAX'N 306 (2000);
Joseph M. Mona, Use of LLCs in Estate Planning; 25 EST. PLAN. 167 (1998);
Travis L. Bowen & Rick D. Bailey, Limited Partnerships: Use in Tax, Estate and
Blfsiness Planning, 32 IDAHO L. REv. 305 (1996); James R. Repetti, Minority
Disc0'1nts: The Alchemy in Estate and Gift Taxation, 50 TAX L. REv. 415 (1995);
Samuel Weiner & Steven D. Leibzig, Family Limited Partnership Can Leverage
the Annual Exclusion and Unified Credit, 82 J. TAX'N 164 (1995); and Robert G.
Kurzman, A Family Partnership Still May be the Best Entity to Meet Income,
Estate Tax Goals, 17 EST. PLAN. 224 (1990).
2
The check-the-box regulations, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (2000), dramatically changed the entity classification landscape. Before their adoption, there
was a possibility that a limited partnership or an LLC could be classified as a
corporation, though the possibility was quite remote. Under the default rule, how
an entity is classified depends on how many owners it has. If the entity has a
single owner who is an individual, it is treated as a sole proprietorship for federal
income tax purposes. If the single owner is a corporation, it is treated as a division. Alternatively, an entity may elect to be classified as a corporation for federal income tax purposes, but it is a rare entity that would make such an election,
given the onus of double taxation for C-corporations. See 1.R.c. §§ 11, 301(c). In
states with updated statutes, limited partnerships and LLCs may be fairly equal
alternatives. In states without updated statutes, limited partnerships may be preferable due to the unfavorable dissolution rules often applicable to LLCs in older
statutes. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. See also KATHRYN G. HENKEL,
ESTATE PLANNING AND WEALTH PRESERVATION § 17.02[13] (1997). See generally MARK SARGENT & WALTER SCHWIDETZKY, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
HANDBOOK, chs. 1-3.
3
Under section 1015, a donee of an FLLE interest generally takes the
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free under section 721(b). In the case of a limited partnership, the
donors (commonly parents or grandparents) will hold the general
partnership interest, likely through a corporation, while in the case
of an LLC, they will hold the managerial interest. They will, over
time, make gifts of limited partnership interests or membership interests to the donees (commonly children or grandchildren). The
availability of minority-interest and lack-of-marketability discounts,
discussed in detail below, means that gifts of ownership interests
can be made at a value less than the proportionate share of the fair
market value of the underlying assets. In making their annual gifts,
the donors will take advantage of the section 2503(b) annual exclusion, which may permit the fIrst $10,000 of discounted value gifted
by a donor to each donee each year to be excluded from gift taxation. 4 Thus, two parents can gift $20,000 per year per donee without
same basis in it that the donor had. See l.R.e. § 1015. In the case of assets with a
basis in excess of fair market value at the time of the gift, a donee generally takes
a fair-market-value basis in gifted property for purposes of loss calculation, a
carryover basis for gain calculation, and recognizes neither gain nor loss if the
property sells for a price in between its fair market value at the time of the gift
and its carryover basis. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-1. Under section 1014, a person
who acquires an FLLE interest by bequest, devise, or inheritance from a decedent
generally takes a fair-market-value basis. See 1.R.e. § 1014. Where practical, it is
wise to gift high-basis, appreciated property (or interests in FLLEs holding such
property) and retain low-basis, appreciated property for eventual transfer after
death. This approach maximizes the basis that the recipient takes in the property
and reduces the income tax consequence on a later sale of the property. It may
still be wise, however, to gift low-basis property if the property is expected to
appreciate rapidly. The disadvantage of the low basis to the donee may be more
than offset by the increased estate taxes to the donor if the property is included in
the donor's estate and substantially appreciates before the donor's death. Further,
any gain recognition on a sale of property may be subject to a favorable capital
gains rate of taxation, commonly 20% under section 1. See I.R.e. § l(h). The gift
and estate tax rate can be as high as 55%, and that rate applies to the full value of
the property, not just the gain. See I.R.C. § 2001(b). If the property has an inherent loss, the taxpayer is often wise to sell it, recognize the loss, and gift the resulting cash.
4
Taxpayers are required to disclose gifts of interests in FLLEs in order for
the statute of limitations to run. See T.D. 8845, 1999-2 C.B. 683 (1999); 1.R.c.
§§ 650 1(c)(9), 2504(c). Section 2503 provides that the first $10,000 per year
given by each donor to each donee is not subject to gift taxation, provided that
the interest given is a present interest. See 1.R.c. § 2503(b). This amount is adjusted for inflation for calendar years after 1998, rounded to the next lowest multiple of $1,000. See I.R.C. § 2503(b)(2). As this article goes to press, no inflation
adjustment has yet been made, and future interests do not qualify for the exclusion. Thus, if the gifted FLLE interest qualifies as a present interest, the first
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$10,000 of (discounted) value per donee will be free of any gift tax or the need to
use any portion of the applicable exclusion amount. The Service has ruled that a
limited partnership interest can constitute a present interest, see Priv. Ltr. Rul.
9415007 (Jan. 12, 1994), and by extension, it is commonly assumed that a membership interest in an LLC constitutes a present interest as well.
However, in a technical advice memorandum (TAM) with unusual facts,
Tech. Adv. Mem. 9751003 (Aug. 28, 1997), the Service ruled that a limited partnership interest did not constitute a present interest, casting doubt on the area. In
TAM 9751003, the donor/general partner had not only the discretion as to when
to distribute partnership funds, but also could retain partnership funds ''for any ...
reason whatsoever." Further, no limited partner was entitled to a return of capital
until 2022, and no limited partner could withdraw from the partnership except on
assignment of all of her partnership interest. Assignment was generally not allowed without a super-majority vote of the partners. See id
The Service noted that a gift can be separated into its component parts,
anyone of which may qualify as a present interest. In this case, the Service considered the right to income and a right to transfer the interest. In the Service's
view, the fact that the general partner could withhold the income for any reason
whatsoever effectively obviated the fiduciary obligation ordinarily imposed on a
general partner, which might otherwise be relied on to insure that income would
be appropriately distributed. The uncertainty as to when or whether the limited
partners would receive any income prevented the income interest from constituting a present interest. In reaching this conclusion, the Service used some disturbing language. It said that the income component of the limited partnership interests failed to require, at the time of the gifts, that there be a steady and ascertainable flow of income to a donee or limited partner. See id In the past, the Service
had not insisted on a steady flow of income for partnership interests to constitute
present interests (though that has been the standard in other contexts, see Comm'r
v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1945)), and it was unclear whether the Service
might attempt to require this in the future. In the TAM, the Service also said that
the partnership agreement's limitations on transfers of the limited partnership
interests meant that the limited partnership interests lacked the tangible and immediate economic benefits necessary to constitute a present interest in this regard
as well. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 9751003, err 26.
Technical Advisory Memorandum 199944003 (July 2, 1999), may have
calmed the waters a bit. In this later TAM, the taxpayers formed a limited partnership and acted as the general partners. Gifts of limited partnership interests
were made to their children. The partnership agreement permitted net cash flow
to be distributed annually to the partners, but did not require it. Limited partners
could assign their partnership interests. The assignees were entitled to distributions of net cash flow or other property but could become a substituted limited
partner only with the unanimous written consent of the general partners, as decided in their sole and absolute discretion. The Service concluded the limited
partnership interests qualified as present interests. See id. The Service noted that
the applicable law entitled a partner to distributions before withdrawal or dissolution. Limited partners could withdraw at any time. The general partners were
under a strict fiduciary duty toward the limited partners and the partnership.

2001]

Last-Gasp Estate Planning

5

gift tax consequences. 5 If a donor gifts property with a value in excess of $10,000 per donee, the donor must file a gift tax return. 6 An
actual gift tax is only due, however, if the total lifetime taxable gifts
made by the donor exceed the "applicable exclusion amount." The
applicable exclusion amount for 2000 and 2001 is $675,000. 7 Generally, only cumulative lifetime and death transfers in excess of
those amounts are actually subject to a gift or estate tax Uointly,
"transfer tax"). 8
The available discounts can be significant. If a property directly owned by donors is worth $100,000, it can, through an FLLE,
be gifted indirectly over time to donees at a value of perhaps only
$65,000. 9 Once properly gifted, the assets are also excluded from
the donor's estate when he dies; any subsequent appreciation inures
to the benefit of the donees and can stay out of the estate of the donor and therefore out of the hands of the estate tax fisc. This type of
planning will be of particular interest to persons who expect their
estates to be subject to an estate tax.
A variant of this form with which the Internal Revenue Service
(Service) and the courts have struggled of late involves an FLLE
formed shortly before a decedent's death. The decedent contributes
property to the FLLE and thus no longer holds the property directly.
Given these factors, the Service concluded that the limited partners had the right
to the immediate use, possession, and enjoyment of the interest. See id.
The moral of the two TAMs is that the donors have to give the limited
partners a little "wiggle room." If, as in TAM 9751003, the donor retains total
control, the Service likely will conclude that the donees have not received a present interest. If, on the other hand, a more typical limited partnership agreement
is used and the limited partners have some independent rights to obtain a current
economic benefit (such as by assigning the interest), the promised land of section
2503(b) likely will be reached.
5
Spouses may split gifts so that a $20,000 gift by one spouse is treated as
if each spouse made a $10,000 gift. I.RC. § 2513.
6
I.RC. § 6019.
7
The applicable exclusion amount increases to $700,000 in 2002 and
2003, $850,000 in 2004, $950,000 in 2005, and $1,000,000 in 2006 and thereafter. See I.RC. §§ 2505, 2010. Given the rate of change of tax laws, and the intentions of the current occupant of the White House, it is unlikely that these amounts
would remain unchanged until phase-in has been completed.
8
FLLEs can also offer a number of nontax benefits. They permit the
smooth transfer of assets from one generation to the next. They provide a practical vehicle in which to hold property for extended families. Management can be
readily centralized, and the owners can be protected against vicarious liability.
9
See HENKEL, supra note 2, § 16.03[I][c].
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Instead, the decedent holds interests in the FLLE that owns the
property. The decedent normally holds the bulk of the interests in
the FLLE. Other family members usually control the corporate general partner of a limited partnership or are the managing members
of an LLC. Notwithstanding the formal structure, however, in many
instances the decedent retains actual control. Beyond shifting control, typically only a few, if any, transfers of interests in the FLLE
are made to others. This structure may give rise to a form of minority-interest discount. While the courts and commentators use the
term minority-interest discount, it is something of a misnomer,
since the decedent typicaliy holds most of the interests. A "lack-ofcontrol" discount might be a better term. Further, since it can be
harder to sell interests. in an FLLE than to sell the underlying property, a lack-of-marketability discount might also be justified. The
disputes that have arisen with the Service commonly involve
FLLEs that are formed in the name of the decedent shortly before
her death by a family member using a power of attoniey, sometimes
creating, almost literally, a last-minute artifice designed to reduce
estate taxes. The Service has hotly disputed this approach, though
to date with little success in the courts. Very recently, in Estate of
Strangi v. Commissioner,lo the Tax Court had the opportunity to
review one such FLLE, and a heavily divided court concluded that
it could not ignore the formation of the FLLE for valuation purposes. While the court rejected many of the Service's core arguments, it also expressed concern over the legitimacy of the decedent's actions. II
This article will focus on such use of FLLEs as found in the
Strangi case and offer proposals for reform. It is hardly wise tax
policy to permit taxpayers to significantly reduce transfer taxes by
dint of a last-minute FLLE of potentially no lasting substance. Further, the line that taxpayers need to cross in order for the structure
to fail is decidedly blurry. Accordingly, this article recommends a
brighter line. Section 2035 should be amended to provide that the
transfer of assets by a decedent to a family-controlled FLLE within
three years of her death would be ignored for estate tax purposes.
Under this proposed amendment, the transfer of an interest in such
an FLLE to members of the decedent's family within three years of
her death would also be ignored. As the Internal Revenue Code
10
11

115 T.e. 478 (2000).
[d. at 485, 489-90.
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(Code) section 2001(b) already provides, credit would be given
against the estate tax for any gift tax paid on the lifetime transfers. 12
This approach would stop the most blatant abuses in the use of
FLLEs while permitting the use of FLLEs for legitimate estate
planning, provided that it is done three years before the death of the
decedent.
II.

RELATED ISSUES

A. Business Purpose

The Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) defmes a partnership as an association formed to carry on a business for profit. 13
That provision should also apply to limited partnerships. 14 Thus, to
be in compliance with typical state law, a limited partnership must.
have a business purpose. Many state LLC statutes do not impose a
business or profit requirement, however, and only require that the
LLC be formed for a lawful purpose.1 5 Under the check-the-box
regulations, a typical multi-member business LLC is classified as a
partnership for federal income tax purposes, but an LLC can also
elect to be taxed as a corporation. 16 The question is whether a nonbusiness LLC can be given that same classification. The Code defmes a partnership for federal income tax purposes as "a syndicate,
group, pool, joint venture, or other incorporated organization,
through or by means of which any business, financial operation, or
venture is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this
title, a trust or estate or a corporation."I? While not free from doubt,
the Code here also suggests the need for a business objective. The
check-the-box regulations state that they are providing rules for the
classification of "business entities," again indicating the need for a
business nexus. IS The courts have required the conduct of some

See 1.R.c. § 2001(b).
See REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 101(6),6 u.L.A. 37 (Supp. 2001).
14 See REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT §§ 101(7) (amended 1985), 1106,
6A V.L.A. 61 (1976).
15 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Corps & Ass'n § 4A-201 (1993).
16 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701(b). See also SARGENT & SCHWIDETZKY, supra
note 2, ch. 2.
17 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2).
18 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a).
12
13
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business activity before finding that a valid tax partnership exits. 19
Finally, the Service often attacks transactions because they lack a
business purpose. 20 Strict adherence to the business requirement
might forestall the use of LLCs for transferring property with a
purely personal character, such as a vacation home used only for
.
personal purposes. 21
B. Marketable Securities/Investment FLLEs
The question that remains open is whether an FLLE that primarily holds marketable securities or other investment assets has a
sufficient business purpose. The Service conceivably could view
the general partners or managing members as trustees and the lim19 See, e.g., Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 633 F.2d 512, 514-15
(7th Cir. 1980); Estate of Winkler v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1657, 1663
(1997).
20 See, e.g., Strangi, 115 T.C. at 485-86.
21 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200004022 (Jan. 28, 20(0). In this ruling, the taxpayers, apparently husband and wife, transferred 98% of their principal residence to
a trust that was a grantor trust for federal income tax purposes. Grantor trusts
generally are ignored for federal income tax purposes, and the grantor of the trust
is deemed to be the owner of the property owned by the trust. The taxpayers
(with a remaining 2% direct ownership) and the trust then transferred the residence to a limited partnership. One question was whether this met the state law
business purpose test that is common for partnerships. The private letter ruling
did not address this issue but did note that the partnership also held "several
small rental properties." [d. These latter properties may have been contributed to
meet a state-law business purpose requirement. The Service did not focus on the
rental properties or, apparently, consider their existence to be relevant to its
analysis. The taxpayers were the general partner; the trust was the limited partner. Therefore, the taxpayers remained the only persons with any ultimate interest
in the underlying property. The partnership ultimately deeded the property back
to the taxpayers and the trust. At issue was the application of section 121, which
permits $250,000 of gain on the sale of a principal residence to be excluded from
gross income if the taxpayers meet certain holding period requirements. See
1.R.c. § 121. The Service ruled that "in order for afederal tax law partnership to
exist, the parties must, in good faith and with a business purpose, intend to join
together in the present conduct of an enterprise and share in the profits or losses
of the enterprise." Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200004022 (Jan. 28, 20(0) (emphasis added).
The Service held that since the residence served no business purpose of the partnership or the taxpayers, the taxpayers were treated as owners of the residence
during the time it was held by the partnership. [d. The Service went on to conclude that for the purposes of the section 121 holding-period requirement, the
taxpayers could count, as part of their holding period, the time the limited partnership held the residence. See id.
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ited partners or passive members as beneficiaries, and treat the
structure as a trust. The passive nature of the enterprise might encourage this approach. Investment partnerships, however, have
commonly been upheld, both for state law and federal income tax
purposes, despite the fact that no true business is being conducted.
Indeed, the Code specifically contemplates investment partnerships
that have never engaged in a trade or business and that primarily
hold cash, stocks, bonds, notes, etc. 22
Having the FILE hold both traditional business assets and
marketable securities may make it easier for it to survive judicial
scrutiny. Estate of Church v. United States,23 discussed below,24
involved a limited partnership that held both marketable securities
as well as a substantial, working ranch. The court permitted substantial discounts. 25
Estate of Harper v. Commissioner 6 involved a family limited
partnership, the primary assets of which were marketable securities.
While the focus of the case was on section 2704(b),27 it is noteworthy that the Service did not raise, and the court was not disturbed
by, the type of assets held by the partnership.28 Finally, in some
districts lhe Service regularly seems willing to settle cases involving FLLEs holding marketable securities, often for total discounts
in the 30% range. 29 While it would be preferable to have unambiguous case law, existing case law and much of the Service's own
conduct do not suggest that investment FLLEs are in any great peril
for lacking a business purpose.
In order for the formation of an FLLE holding marketable securities to get a tax-free treatment, the FLLE cannot constitute an
investment company.30 There are different ways by which an FLLE
is deemed to be an investment company, but the one most relevant
See 1.R.e. § 731(c)(3)(C)(i).
2000-1 U.S.T.e. (CCH) <J[ 60,369 (W.O. Tex. 2000).
24 See infra Part III.D.
25 See Church, 2000-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) at 84,781.
26 79 T.e.M. (CCH) 2232 (2000).
27 See infra Part U(F)(2).
28 See Harper, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2233.
29 See Michael 1. Eggers, Settlement Data and the Effect on Family Limited
Partnership Discounts, 21 EST. PLAN. & CAL. PROB. REp. 137 (Apr. 2000). The
Estate Planning and California Probate Reporter is a publication of Continuing
Education of the Bar of California.
30 See I.R.C. § 721(b).
22
23
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in this context is if more than 80% of the FLLE's assets, by value,
consist of money, stocks, securities and other comparable assets. 3)

C. Section 704(e)
At one time, the Service argued that donees of partnership interests were not bona fide partners, but section 704(e) now generally overrules that view.32 A partner who receives her interest by
gift will be recognized as a bona fide partner, provided capital is a
material income-producing factor for the partnership.33 It should be
noted, however, that section 704(e) also requires that each interest
share proportionately in partnership income generated by capital. 34
Thus, the Code does not allow a dilution of the donor's share of
income by an inappropriate special allocation35 of such income to
the donee partners. Section 704(e) further requires the donor to be
adequately compensated for services rendered to the partnership. 36
31 See id. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.351-I(c)(I) (2001) (as modified by Tax
Relief Act of 1997 § 1002, amending 1.R.c. § 351(e». There are exceptions for
. insignificant diversification and where each of several transferors transfers a
diversified portfolio.
32 See I.R.c. § 704(e).
33 I.R.c. § 704(e)(1).
34 I.R.c. § 704(e)(3).
35 Section 704 permits special allocations of income and loss to partners,
provided that the allocation has substantial economic effect. See 1.R.c. § 704(b).
It is then possible, for example, to allocate 90% of depreciation deductions to
someone who is otherwise a 50% partner. In the family context, however, section
704 typically requires proportionate allocation of income to the donor. See I.R.C.
§ 704(e)(3).
36 Taxpayers should be cautious about naming minor children as partners.
The Service has stated that a minor child must be competent to manage her own
business affairs in order to be recognized as a member of a partnership; in order
to be a partner, a minor must have sufficient maturity and experience to be
treated by disinterested persons as competent to enter into business dealings and
otherwise to conduct his affairs on a basis of equality with adult persons. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(viii). A minor who does not meet this standard, however, can still be a recognized partner as long as another person acts in a fiduciary
capacity and exercises control over the partnership interest for the sole benefit of
the minor; and accordingly, many practitioners place the partnership interest of a
minor, especially younger minors, in trust or appoint a custodian to hold the interest. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (e)(2)(vii). Taking advantage of the $10,000
annual exclusion of section 2503(b) may require the use of "Crummey" powers.
For a discussion of how these powers work, see HENKEL, supra note 2, §
10.03[4].
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D. Minority-Interest Discount
A decedent's interest in an FLLE may be given a minorityinterest discount. Notwithstanding the common use of this term, a
lack-of-control discount might be a better term in the context of this
article. The decedent typically will own the bulk of the interests in
the FLLE. Others will control the general partner of a limited partnership or be the managers of an LLC. The discount arises because
the decedent cannot control current management decisions and consequently the entity's future. It also reflects a lack of control over
the quality of the investment represented by the interest. For example, whether or not distributions will be made is in the hands of others.37 The Tax Court has ruled that family attribution rules are not
applied to limit the availability of minority-interest discounts. 38 A
decedent's family can therefore own the majority (or all) of the interests in an FLLE, and a minority-interest discount can still be
available. 39
E. Lack-oj-Marketability Discount

The lack-of-marketability discount arises from the decedent's
inability (or reduced ability) to readily dispose of the interest in the
FLLE.40 An interest could lack marketability even though the
37 See Ward v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 78, 103-109 (1986). See also LeFrak v.
Comm'r, 66 T.e.M.(CCH) 1297, 1307-1309 (1993); Estate of Trenchard v.
Comm'r, 69 T.e.M.(CCH) 2164, 2172-74 (1995). Of course, there can be no
minority-interest discount if the taxpayer owns all of the interests in the entity.
38 See Estate of Andrews v. Comm'r, 79 T.e. 938 (1982) (involving corporate stock). If family attribution rules were applied, children, for example, could
be considered to own the interests owned by their parents for purposes of determining whether a minority interest was held. See 1.R.e. § 318(a)(I).
39 In an attempt to counter this across-the-board discount, the Service has
argued that the value of a minority interest is enhanced if it represents a swing
vote. The court in Winkler, 57 T.e.M. at 381, determined that a minority-held
block of common stock that constituted the swing vote in a company controlled
by two separate families should be increased in value by at least 10%. This increase effectively eliminated the minority-interest discount the family had originally claimed. See id. For a similar example, see Estate of Simp lot v. Commissioner, 112 T.e. 130 (1999), in which the Service successfully argued that where
the estate held voting stock in a corporation with an unusual capital structure of
voting and nonvoting stock, a premium for voting privileges was appropriate. See
112 T.e. at 172-73.
40 Andrews, 79 T.C. at 953.
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owner holds a majority of the total interests. The Tax Court has
given such a discount to a decedent who owned 61 % of the stock in
a corporation. 41 The court reasoned that a lack-of-marketability discount was warranted because there was no established market for
the corporation's stock, which was unlisted and closely held. 42 No
lack-of-marketability discount, however, should be available if the
decedent owns 100% of the relevant FLLE, since then the taxpayer
would have total control, and could sell all of the ownership interests or cause the entity to sell all of its assets. 43 A buyer in such an
instance should pay full value, since she could buy all there is to
acqurre.
Many states provide that a limited partner may have his individual interest liquidated for fair value on six months' notice unless
the partnership agreement provides to the contrary.44 An increasing
number of states, in response to prompting from the estate planning
practitioners, are eliminating this right.45 If the state allows for such
a withdrawal, the amount of any lack-of-marketability discount
would be reduced, since it would be easier to liquidate the interest.
The discount should not be reduced to zero, however, since what
constitutes a fair value is uncertain. Further, the limited partner
would have to wait six months, during which time the fair value
could change. These limitations should allow for a meaningful lackof-marketability discount. Most states with withdrawal rights permit the partnership agreement to override it; however, due to' the
application of section 2704(b), discussed below, such a provision
will not improve the discount. 46
Both limited partnerships and LLCs can "dissolve." A dissolution is not a liquidation of the FLLE. From the outside world's per41
See Trenchard, 69 T.e.M. (CCH) at 2172-73. The court determined that
in this case a control premium existed. See id.; see also Estate of Newhouse v.
Comm'r, 94 T.e. 193,249-52 (1990).
42 See Trenchard, 69 T.e.M. (CCH) at 2173.
43 Indeed, the entity would have to be an LLe.
44 See, e.g., N.Y. P'SHIP LAW § 121-602 (McKinney 2001); S. Stacy Eastland, Family Limited Partnerships: Transfer Tax Benefits, 7 FROB. & PROP. 59,
61 (1993).
45
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 1O-603(a) (1999). This
section was amended in 1998 to eliminate the six-month withdrawal right and
provide that unless the partnership agreement provides to the contrary, a limited
partner may not withdraw before the dissolution and winding up of the limited
partnership. See id.
46 See infra Part II.F.2.
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spective, nothing may appear to have happened, but there can have
been a technical termination of the FLLE, typically immediately
followed by its reformation. 47 A withdrawal of a general partner of
a limited partnership or a member of an LLC can cause a dissolution. It may take a vote of the majority of the owners to continue an
FLLE once it has been dissolved. This in tum makes it more likely
that the FLLE will liquidate, giving the owners value for their interests. The more likely the prospect of a dissolution, the lower the
. lack-of-marketability discount should be. The withdrawal of a limited partner typically does not cause the dissolution of a limited
partnership.48 However, the withdrawal of a member of an LLC
historically did cause it to dissolve. This used to make a limited
partnership preferable to an LLC for family estate planning, since
there was less chance of a dissolution and, therefore, a greater lackof-marketability discount. However, as states amend their LLC
statutes to take into account the check-the-box regulations, state
statutes increasingly provide that the withdrawal of a member of an
LLC does not cause a dissolution ofthe LLC. 49
F. Section 2704

1. In General
Congress enacted section 2704 to curtail the use of restrictions
and lapsing rights as estate planning tools. Previously, for example,
a restriction on liquidation rights might have been placed on a family partnership interest prior to its transfer to another family member, possibly reducing its value considerably. In many instances,
after the transfer, the partners agreed to remove the restriction, or
else the restriction automatically lapsed. The donor's controlling
interests often were designed to lapse upon her death. As a result,
there may have been no interest to value in the donor's estate. Now,
however, section 2704 places constraints on both of these planning
areas. 50 The part of section 2704 that is most relevant in the context
of this article is section 2704(b).
47 See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIB STEIN
ON PARTNERSHIP § 7.01 (2001); LARRY E. RIB STEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE,
RmSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 11.01 (2001).
48 See BROMBERG & RmSTEIN, supra note 46, §§ 17.01(f), 17.05.
49 See RIB STEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 46, § 11.01.
50 See generally HENKEL, supra note 2, §§ 16.03[3][d]-[e].
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2. Section 2704(b) and the Applicable Restriction
Section 2704(b) provides that if there is a transfer of an interest
in a partnership to a member of the donor's family,5l any"applicable restriction" is ignored in determining the value of the interest.52
An applicable restriction is any restriction that limits the ability of
the partnership to liquidate, provided either that the restriction by its
terms can lapse or that the transferor or any member of the transferor's family, either alone or collectively, has the right to remove
the restriction. 53 Thus, a provision in a family limited partnership
agreement stating that the consent of 100% of the partners is required for liquidation, when state law only requires 70% consent,
would be an applicable restriction, since the family as a group could
have the provision removed from the agreement. 54
A limited partner normally will not have a statutory power to
cause a liquidation of a limited partnership. 55 Many states, however,
51 Defiged as the transferor's spouse, the transferor's or her spouse's ancestors and lineal descendants, and the brother or a sister of the transferor. Also
included are spouses of the covered ancestor, lineal descendants, brothers, and
sisters. See 1.R.e. § 2704(c)(2).
52 1.R.e. § 2704(b).
53 See id. Section 2704 excludes from the definition of an applicable restriction any restriction imposed by federal or state law. See 1.R.e. § 2704(b)(3)(B).
Also excluded is any commercially reasonable restriction which arises as part of
any financing by the corporation or partnership with a person who is not related
to the transferor or transferee, or a member of the family of either. See 1.R.e. §
2704(b)(3)(A). The regulations provide somewhat liberally that an applicable
restriction is a limitation on the ability to liquidate the entity (in whole or in part)
that is more restrictive than the limitations that would apply under the state law
generally applicable to the entity in the absence of the restriction. See Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2704-2(b). In Kerr v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 449 (1999), the Tax Court
held that a provision in a partnership agreement that a partnership would liquidate as of a certain date or when agreed to by the partners did not involve an
applicable restriction because state law provided that a limited partnership would
dissolve upon the occurrence of events specified in the partnership agreement or
by the written consent of all of the partners. See 113 T.e. at 472. Accord Estate
of Jones v. Comm'r, 116 T.e. 121, 132-33 (2001); Knight v. Comm'r, 115 T.C.
506,513-14 (2000); Harper, 79 T.C.M. (CCA) at 2234.
54 Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(d), ex. 1. The Treasury Regulations provide that
an option, the right to use property, or an agreement that is subject to section
2703 does not constitute an applicable restriction. See Treas. Reg. § 25.27042(b).
55 REVISED VNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 801,6 V.L.A. 108 (Supp. 2001).
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provide that a limited partner may withdraw on six-months' notice
and be paid fair value for her interest unless the partnership agreement provides to the contrary. 56 If there is such a provision to the
contrary in the partnership agreement, some have thought section
2704(b) would treat it as an applicable restriction and require that it
be ignored for the purpose of computing the discounts. 57 Indeed,
many states have removed the right of a limited partner to withdraw
on six months' notice, so as to improve the availability of discounts,
and to address the fear that if the partnership agreement removed
the right it would trigger the section 2704(b) applicable restriction
rules. 58 Recently, however, in Kerr v. Commissioner, 59 the Tax
Court held that section 2704(b) did not apply to limited partner
withdrawal provisions, rejecting the argument to the contrary by the
Service. 6o The court premised its holding on the fact that the applicable restriction rules of section 2704(b) only speak to limitations
on the liquidation of a partnership as a whole, and do not address
limited-partner withdrawal. 61
A comparable issue exists for LLCs. Only a minority of states
permits members of an LLC to voluntarily withdraw; a right to
payment is then uncommon, and dissolution is generally not triggered. 62 To the extent withdrawal and payment rights do exist, under Kerr it would appear they could be removed by the operating
agreement without concern for section 2704(b), assuming dissolution would not be triggered. Many states, however, provide that an
LLC will dissolve on an event of involuntary disassociation such as
the death, bankruptcy, or expUlsion of a member unless the operating agreement provides to the contrary.63 If a provision in the operating agreement does provide to the contrary, even under Kerr the
provision could constitute an applicable restriction according to
section 2704(b), since, unlike a withdrawal, it limits the ability of
the LLC to liquidate. The LLC statutes contain such dissolution
provisions in order to avoid the characteristic of continuity of life,
UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 603 (amended 1985), 6A V.L.A. 217 (1976).
See Tech. Adv. Mem. 9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997).
58 See BROMBERG & RmSTEIN, supra note 46, § 17.01(c).
59 113 T.e. 449.
60 See 113 T.e. at 463-64. See also Jones, 116 T.e. at 132-33; Knight, 115
T.e. at 513-14; Harper, T.e.M. (CCH) at 2234.
61 See Kerr, 113 T.e. at 473.
62 See RmSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 46, app. 11-1.
63 Id. § 11.02.
56

57

16

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 21:1

an important consideration under the pre-check-the-box regulations
but now just so much excess baggage. 64 Statutory dissolution pro vi- .
sions can reduce the availability of the lack-of-marketability discount, since it makes it more likely that the LLC will liquidate and
the owners receive value for their interests. Consequently, the trend
is for state statutes to provide that LLCs have perpetual life, eliminating this issue altogether. 65
III. THE SHAM-TAMs
A. The Basics
In a series of Technical Advice Memoranda, the Service ignored the creation of FILEs, instead valuing a decedent's estate as
if it held the assets of the FLLE directly.66 The TAMs had similar
facts. Typically, children of a dying parent created an FLLE on behalf of the parent, using either a power of attorney granted them by
the parent or their powers as trustees of a trust created for the benefit of the parent. The children controlled the FLLE and the parent
held the bulk of the beneficial interests in it. In one case, a limited
partnership was created within two days after the parent's death-after the parent had been removed from life support. 67 By having
the parent shift from direct ownership to indirect ownership through
an FLLE controlled by the children, the children hoped that the parent's estate would obtain minority-interest and lack-ofmarketability discounts on the FLLE interests retained by the parent. In the TAMs, the parent's estate took discounts ranging from
30% to 55%.68
64 See id. §§ 11.01, 16.20. Prior to the check-the-box regulations, an unincorporated entity could be classified as a corporation in the highly unlikely event
that it had a majority of the following characteristics: continuity of life, centralized management, limited liability, and free transferability of interest. See
SARGENT & SCHWIDETZKY, supra note 2, ch. 2.
65 See RmSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 46, § 11.01. See also MD. CODE
ANN., CORPs. & ASS'NS § 4A-203(1).
66 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 9719006 (Jan. 14, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem.
9723009 (Feb. 24, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997); Tech. Adv.
Mem. 9730004 (Apr. 3, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9735003 (May 8, 1997); Tech.
Adv. Mem. 9736004 (June 6, 1997).
67 See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 9719006 (Jan. 14, 1997).
68 Compare Tech. Adv. Mem. 9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997) (38%) with Tech.
Adv. Mem. 9735004 (Apr. 21, 1997) (55%).
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The Service made several arguments for its holdings. One of
the arguments, in essence, was that given the proximity of the death
and the lack of direct involvement by the decedent, the FLLEs were
shams. 69 The Service cited Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner70 as
authority for its position. 7) In Murphy, eighteen days before the decedent died, she had transferred to her two children less than a 2%
stock interest in a family-run, closely-held corporation. 72 The transfer reduced the decedent's ownership interest in the corporation to
just below 50%. The estate claimed a minority-interest discount for
the remaining stock. The Tax Court denied the discount, stating that
a minority-interest discount should not be applied if the explicit
purpose and effect of fragmenting the control block of stock was
solely to reduce federal tax. 73 However, the court did allow a discount for lack of marketability.74
Murphy should be contrasted with Estate of Frank v. Commissioner. 75 In Frank, the son of the decedent held the decedent's
power of attorney. Two days before the decedent's death, pursuant
to the power of attorney, the son transferred stock owned by the
decedent to the decedent's wife. The transfer reduced the decedent's ownership interest in the family corporation from over 50%
to 32%.76 The court held that the transfer was valid and allowed a
20% minority-interest discount and a 30% lack-of-marketability
discount on the remaining stock included in the estate. 77 The Service argued that the court should apply the substance-over-form
doctrine and ignore the transfer. 78 The court refused to do so, noting
that if tax avoidance were the sole motive, a substantially smaller
number of shares could have been transferred. 79 As I will discuss in
69 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem.
9719006 (Jan. 14, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9723009 (Feb. 24, 1997); Tech. Adv.
Mem. 9730004 (Apr. 21, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9736004 (June 6,1997).
70 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645 (1990).
71
See Tech. Adv. Mem, 9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem.
9736004 (Apr. 21, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9730004 (Apr. 21, 1997); Tech.
Adv. Mem. 9723009 (Feb. 24, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9719006 (Jan. 14, 1997).
72 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 645.
73 See id. at 658.
74 See id. at 657.
75 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2255 (1995).
76 See id. at 2256-57.
77 See id. at 2259,2263.
78 See id. at 2259.
79 See id.
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more detail below,so the extent to which a decedent transfers interests in FLLEs shortly before death should not be a basis for a differing tax treatment. If the formation of an FLLE shortly before death
is a problem, it should be a problem whether or not the decedent
transfers in~erests. Otherwise, decedents will be able to avoid attack
by the simple expedient of making the necessary transfers, elevating form over substance. S1

B. Section 2703
In the TAMs, the Service made an apparently unprecedented
argument, stating that section 2703(a)(2) applied, which provides
that the value of property is determined without regard to "any restriction on the right to sell or use such property."S2 In the Service's
view, the "partnership or LLC wrapper" covering the decedent's
assets was a restriction within the meaning of section 2703(a)(2)
and, therefore, should be ignored. s3 Without the FLLE wrapper, the
decedent could still be considered to own the bulk of the relevant
property, which, to that extent, eliminates the discounts.
Section 2703(b) provides an exception to the application of
section 2703(a)(2) if the following three tests are met: (1) the arrangement is a bona fide business transaction, (2) the transaction is
not a device to transfer property to members of the family of the
decedent for less than full consideration, and (3) the transaction has
terms that are comparable to similar transactions entered into by
persons dealing at arm's length.S4 In the TAMs, the Service concluded that section 2703(b) did not apply. 85 It would be a rare FLLE
that could meet the requirements of this section, since typically the
whole point of the transfer is to provide a device to transfer propSee infra Part VI.
Most likely, there would be no transfer tax savings beyond any availability of the discounts, since gift taxes paid within t.lrree years of death are brought
back into the estate under section 2035, and property is unlikely to change in
value between the time of a death-bed gift and the time of death. See I.R.C. §
2035.
82 1.R.c. § 2703(a)(2). See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997);
Tech. Adv. Mem. 9730004 (Apr. 3, 1997).
83 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem.
9723009 (Feb. 24, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9719006 (Jan. 14, 1997).
84 See 1.R.c. § 2703(b).
85 See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem.
9735003 (May 8, 1997).
80

81
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erty to members of the family of the decedent for less than full consideration, contrary to part two of the exception. 86
However, the legislative history to section 2703(a)(2) does
not seem to contemplate the manner in which the Service is applying its provisions. The section appears to have been intended to
prevent buy-sell agreements among family members from reducing
the value of the interests the family members hold, rather than to
provide an opportunity to ignore the formation of an FLLE altogether. 87 Further, the Service's approach would mostly render moot
section 2704(b), which Congress presumably would not have intended. 88 There would be little need to have "applicable restrictions" in the operating agreement be ignored under such a rule. The
Service's use of section 2703(a)(2) is aggressive and, in fact, has
not met with success in the courts.
C. The Courts

In a number of recent cases, the Service has used a variety of
arguments to attack FLLEs.89 Somewhat surprisingly in some cases,
the Service has had little success. Still, one detects genuine skepticism toward FLLEs formed near death, and the final judicial chapter on the matter likely has not been written.
1. The Church Case
In Estate of Church v. Commissioner,9o Mrs. Church and her
two children owned a combined 57% interest in a large ranch,
which they leased for grazing and oil and gas drilling. 91 Distant
relatives owned the balance of the ranch, which was managed by

But see Church, 2000-1 U.S.T.e. (CCH) 'II 60,369.
See HENKEL, supra note 2, § 16.03[3][c].
88 See supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
89 In Field Service Advice Memorandum 200049003, the Service gives a
variety of bases for attacking FLLEs, which are in fact generally used in the cases
discussed below. Field Servo Adv. Mem. 200049003 (Sept. 1,2000).
90 2000-1 U.S.T.e. (CCH) 'II 60,369. For a discussion of Church, as well as
of Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.e. 144 (2000), discussed infra
notes 168-178 and accompanying text, see Jerald August and Adi Rappoport,
Recent Decisions Frustrate Service's Efforts to Challenge FLPs, 27 EST. PLAN.
19 (2000).
91
See Church, 2000-1 U.S.T.e. (CCH) at 84,777.
86

87
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Mrs. Church's children. 92 Mrs. Church intended to transfer
$1,000,000 in marketable securities and her interest in the ranch to
a newly formed family limited partnership.93 Her two children also
intended to transfer their interests in the family ranch to the partnership.94 There was apparently no intent on the part of Mrs. Church to
transfer the partnership interests she was to receive to others. The
general partner was supposed to be a corporation controlled by the
two children. 95 Two days after attempting to form the relevant entities, Mrs. Church died of a heart attack. 96 While she had been ill
with cancer, her death was unexpected.97 At the time of her death,
the certificate of limited partnership had not been filed, and the corporation had not yet been incorporated. 98 The account that held the
marketable securities remained in Mrs. Church's name. 99 The government argued that the transactions had no substance and that this
was merely a device to remove assets from Mrs. Church's estate. lOO
The district court found that under Texas law a valid limited partnership was formed notwithstanding the procedural irregularities,
and that the limited partnership held the relevant assets. IOI
The Church case was distinguishable from more abusive cases
by the significant business and nontax motivations that were involved. The court held that the primary purpose of the partners in
forming the partnership was a desire to preserve the family ranching enterprise for themselves and their descendants. lo2 Bringing
organization to the ranch would remove it from the control of one
or more fractional, undivided-interest owners who could use the
property at will, interfere with operations, and ultimately force a
partition or sale of the ranch. 103 Mrs. Church and her children had
already experienced the consequences of an undivided ownership in
a real-estate-based business enterprise. 104 Prior to formation of the
92

93
94
95

96
97
98
99

100
101

102
103
104

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

at 84,778.
at 84,777-78.
at 84,778.
at 84,779.
at 84,780.
at 84,778.
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partnership, Mrs. Church's nephew had exercised his rights as an
undivided owner by moving onto the ranch, interfering with operations, threatening legal action, and almost driving off the §razing
lessee who was the major source of the ranch's income. I 5 Mrs.
Church, her two children, and their cousin had to solve this threat
by borrowing money to purchase the nephew's interest. 106 Moreover, they knew this nephew would likely inherit an additional interest in the ranch through his father and have to be bought out
again. 107 This did in fact occur after formation of the partnership.108
The securities contributed to the partnership by Mrs. Church provided the $ 200,000 in capital necessary for this second buy_out. 109
The court also noted that the partnership was formed with an eye
toward the possibility of actively engaging in raising cattle. 110 Although the ranch was in the midst of a prolonged and continuing
drought, and the grazing lease expired in 1994 without the certainty
that it would be renewed, the partnership was prepared, if necessary, to replace this lost income through active operations. III Working capital over and above income from the ranch would have been
necessary to engage in this activity.112
The court also rejected the Service's arguments that section
2703(a)(2) permitted it to ignore the partnership wrapper." 3 The
court noted that there was no legislative, regulatory, or case law
support for this position.11 4 Given that the children, like Mrs.
Church, contributed their own interests in the ranch in exchange for
partnership interests, the court held that the transfer was not a device to transfer property to members of her family for less than full
consideration and that the terms were comparable to those entered
into by persons dealing at arm's length. ll5 These holdings, along
with the court's holding that the transfers involved a bona fide
105
106
107

108
109
110

III

112
113

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id at 84,778-79.
See id.
See id. at 84,779.
See id.
See id
See id at 84,779,84,781. See also supra notes 83-88 and accompanying

text.
114
115

See Church, 2000-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) at 84,781.
See id at 84,779.
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business arrangement, brought the transfers within the exception
contained in section 2703(b).116 Thus, only the limited partnership
interests were included in Mrs. Church's estate. Although Mrs.
Church transferred about $1.5 million worth of assets to the limited
partnership, the court held that after the minority-interest and lackof-marketability discounts, the value of the limited partnership interests in her estate was about $600,000. 117
Church is most noteworthy for being atypical of the FLLEs
under discussion in this article. The children made substantial contributions to the partnership, and there were reasons beyond estate
planning for its formation. Mrs. Church's death was unexpected,
and the court was clear on the bona fide business nature of the
transaction. None of these factors will be present for a typical lastminute FLLE. Consequently, the case provides little in the way of
general guidance. It also does not provide much in the way of specific guidance on section 2703 for the Service or the taxpayer, since
the court held that the transaction came within the section 2703(b)
exception, which commonly would not be the case. 118 It does perhaps suggest that the courts will be inclined to uphold bona fide
transactions that follow from good planning, but that. is not exactly
surprising.
2. The Strange Strangi C ase119
Albert Strangi, a self-made millionaire, lived and died in
Waco, Texas. 120 He married, divorced, and remarried, with children
from the first marriage and stepchildren from the second. 121 Strangi
survived his second wife. 122 A son-in-law, a lawyer, prepared many
of the estate planning documents and held the decedent's general
power of attomey.123 In August 1994, fresh from an estate planning
seminar, the son-in-law formed a Texas limited partnership, SLFP,

116

See id. at 84,779, 84,781. See also supra notes 53-56 and accompanying

117

See Church, 2000-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) at 84,780.
See id. at 84,779-81.
Strangi, 115 T.e. 478.
See id. at 478-79.
See id. at 479.
See id. at 480.
See id. at 479.

text.
118
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and its Texas corporate general partner, Stranco, Inc. 124 At the time
Strangi was suffering from terminal cancer. The son-in-law handled
all of the details of the formation .and executed the documents as
Strangi's attomey-in-fact. 125 Stranco had the sole authority to conduct the business affairs of SFLP without the concurrence of any
limited partner. 126 The son-iii-law assigned to SFLP Strangi's interest in certain real estate, securities, accrued interest and dividends,
insurance policies, and annuities with a combined fair market value
of $9,876,929. 127 Seventy-five percent of the value was attributable
to cash and securities. 128 Strangi purchased a 47% interest in
Stranco for $49,350, and his four children purchased the remaining
53% for $55,650. 129 Stranco contributed $100,333 to the limited
partnership in exchange for a 1% partnership interest. 130 Since the
children had control of Stranco, they technically also had control of
the limited partnership. 131 All these transactions were completed by
August 1994. 132 In October of that year, Strangi died. 133
In 1995, SFLP distributed several million dollars to Strangi's
estate to pay, or otherwise address, state and federal estate and inheritance taxes. 134 SFLP also extended lines of credit to three of the
children. 135 In 1995 and 1996, SFLP distributed $563;000 to each of
the Strangi children, characterizing them as distributions from the
estate. 136 In May 1996, SFLP divided its primary Merrill Lynch
account into four separate accounts in each of the Strangi children's
names, giving them control over a proportionate share of the partnership assets. 137 By 1998, SFLP had distributed around $2.5 million to each of the Strangi children. 138
See id. at 480-81.
See id. at 480-82.
126 See id.
127 See id. at 481.
128 See id.
129 Three of the children borrowed the funds for their shares from the fourth
child, giving unsecured promissory notes in turn. See id.
130 See id. at 481.
131 See id. at 481-82.
132 See id. at 482.
133 See id.
134 See id. at 482-83.
135 See id.
136 See id. at 483.
137 See id.
138 See id.
124
125
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When filing the estate tax return, Strangi's estate took minority-interest and lack-of-marketability discounts on the value of the
SFLP interests it held. 139 At trial, the Service argued that the existence of SFLP should be disregarded for lack of a business purpose
and economic substance. 140 The estate countered with two main
arguments. First, it claimed that SFLP helped insulate Strangi from
an anticipated tort claim by a caregiver, and the estate from a will
contest by disinherited stepchildren, through the creation of another
layer with which creditors would have to contend. 141 Second, the
estate maintained that SFLP provided a joint investment vehicle for
managing Strangi's assets. 142 The court largely rejected the estate's
arguments, stating that there was no realistic prospect of either a
tort claim or a will contest. 143 Since Strangi ended up with 99.47%
of the SFLP, directly or indirectly, and three of the four Strangi
children were not meaningfully involved in the affairs of SLFP
prior to the fragmentation of the Merrill Lynch account, the court
concluded that a joint-investment motive was not apparent either. l44
Further, SFLP conducted no active business. 145 Actual control was
exercised by the son-in-law, via the power of attorney, meaning that
technically Strangi retained control. 146 Interestingly, the court noted
that the Service might have had a claim that the assets of SFLP
could have been included in Strangi's estate under section 2036. 147
Luckily for the estate, however, the court did not address the section 2036 issue, because the Service had failed to assert that argument in a timely manner. 148 This is an important issue, and will be
discussed in detail below. 149
The court concluded that despite the questionable motivations,
SFLP was in fact a validly created entity.150 The existence of the
partnership in fact changed the relationships between Strangi and
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

See id.
See id. at 484.
See id. at 485.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 485-86.
See id. at 486.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See infra Part IV.
See Strangi, 115 T.e. at 486-87.
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his heirs, and the court concluded that the rartnership could not be
ignored for federal income tax purposes. 15 Although the majority
did not state so explicitly, an inference can be drawn from the majority's rejection of any legitimate nontax motivations for the formation of the limited partnership that, barring the application of
section 2036, a legally formed state law entity cannot be ignored for
valuation purposes. 152 As will be discussed below,153 the dissenting
judges took issue with this perspective, which is indeed a surprising
one. If section 2036 can be avoided, which should readily be possible,154 then a decedent can reduce the valuation of her estate by
simply putting her assets into an FLLE before her death, notwithstanding the fact that the FLLE was formed primarily for taxavoidance purposes. 155 It hardly seems sensible to allow significant
amounts of estate taxes to be so easily avoided. The proposal set
forth below would largely eliminate such tax avoidance.
In Strangi, the Service argued, as it had in the TAMs,156 that
section 2703 provided a basis for ignoring the "partnership wrapper.,,157 The court rejected the argument, noting that neither section
2703's statutory nor its regulatory language supports such an interpretation. 15S Chapter 14, which includes sections 2701 through
2704, was intended to target transfer tax valuation abuses in the
intra-family context, while relieving taxpayers of the broad sweep
of section 2036(c) as previously enacted. 159 Congress wanted to
value property interests more accurately when they were transferred
instead of including previously transferred property in the transSee id.
See id.
153 See infra notes 133-53 and accompanying text.
154 See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
155 See Strangi, lIS T.e. at 498 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
156 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
157 See Strangi, 115 T.e. at 487-88. See also supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
158 See Strangi, lIS T.C. at 488.
159 See id. The pre-1991 version of section 2036 provided that if a person
held a substantial interest in an enterprise and transferred property having a disproportionately large share of the potential appreciation in her interest in the
enterprise while retaining interest in its income, she was considered to have retained the enjoyment of the transferred property. See I.R.C. § 2036(c) (1990).
That would have triggered section 2036(a), requiring inclusion of the transferred
property in the estate at death. The court was obviously not amiss in characterizing the pre-1991 version of section 2036(c) as hav~g a broad sweep.
151

152
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feror's gross estate. 160 The court accurately noted that treating the
partnership assets rather than the decedent's interest in the partnership as the "property" to which section 2703 applied, would raise
anew the difficulties Congress sought to avoid by enacting Chapter
14.161 Accordingly, the court concluded that Congress did not intend through the enactment of section 2703 for the Service to be
able to look through the partnership wrapper and treat the decedent
as owning the assets transferred to the partnership rather than' owning the partnership interest. 162 Indeed, the Service's arguments under section 2703 were a stretch and, as the court rightly indicated,
clearly beyond what Congress intended when enacting section
2703. 163 Therefore, it was quite appropriate that the arguments
failed.
The Service also argued that Strangi made a gift when he
transferred property to the partnership and received in return a limited partnership interest of lesser value. l64 Since Strangi gave up
property worth $10 million and received back limited partnership
interest arguably worth around $6.5 million, the Service maintained
that the difference was a gift.165 The court noted, however, that
since Strangi's interest in SFLP exceeded 99%, and his contribution
was allocated to his own capital account, the transfer of property
could not be considered a gift. 166 Since essentially nothing Strangi
put in went anywhere but to his own account, there was no one to
whom a gift could have been made.
While this part of the argument provides a reasonable basis
for not finding a gift on formation, the court also stated that the decedent had not given up "control over the assets," notwithstanding
the fact that he only had a minority interest in the general partner. 167
It is not entirely clear what the court meant by this cryptic statement. Perhaps the statement is no more than casual dicta, since the
court grounded its holding on the fact that nothing of real signifi-

a

160

161
162
163
164
165
166

See Strangi, 115 T.C. at 488.
See id.
See id. at 488-89.
See id. at 488.
See id. at 489.
See id,
See id. at 489-90. The Tax Court reaffirmed this view in Jones, 116 T.C.

at 128.
167

Strangi, 115 T.e. at 490.
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cance was given to others. 168 However, if the court really believed
Strangi kept control, it is hard to understand the discount it ultimately allowed.
While the court did not accept the Service's legal arguments, it
also did not accept the estate's valuation. 169 Rather than the 43.75%
discount claimed by the estate, the court permitted a 31 % discount
for the partnership interest. 170 The latter amount was based on the
Service's experts, and the court indicated that even this discount
could be overly generous. 171 SLFP was not in a risky business or
one in which the continuing value of the assets depended on continuing operations, and there was no real issue as to liquidity. In
A total of seven judges joined in the majority opinion. There
were two concurring and four dissenting opinions.173 The number
of dissents and concurrences indicates that the Tax Court judges are
far from uniform in their views and that similar cases in the future
may generate different outcomes. The appellate courts also have
generally not yet addressed this issue.
Judge Wells, in the only written concurrence, believed that
the majority misapplied the "economic substance argument.,,174
Since the majority rejected the alleged business purposes underlying the formation of the partnership, a proper application of the
economic substance doctrine would ignore the partnership, assuming the doctrine's applicability.175 In Judge Wells' view, the court
should have concluded that the economic substance doctrine did not
operate to disregard a validly formed entity where the issue is the
value for federal gift and estate tax purposes of the interest transSee id.
See id. at 490-91.
170 See id. at 491-92.
171 See id. at 492-93.
I72 See id. at 491-92.
173 See id. at 493, 494, 496, 500.
174 See id. at 493. The nomenclature Judge Wells used is not one that is
commonly employed. The "substance over form" doctrine is probably the more
common term. Judge Wells' usage is nonetheless consistent with Gregory v.
Heivering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), cited by the majority, in which the Supreme
Court stated that a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic substance
and not shaped solely by tax avoidance features should be respected for tax purposes. 293 U.S. at 469-70. Judge Foley agreed with Judge Wells' concurrence.
See Strangi, 115 T.C. at 494. Judge Laro concurred without expressing an opinion. See id. at 493.
175 See id. at 493-94.
168
169
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ferred in the entity. 176 This concurrence is at least slightly curious in
that it is not at all clear that the majority in fact applied the economic substance doctrine. Nevertheless, while not free from doubt,
the majority did seem to reject the notion that there was any economic substance to the formation of SLFP, and in effect appeared
to agree with Judge Wells that the doctrine did not apply in this
context. 177 Perhaps what troubled Judge Wells and triggered his
concurrence was the ambiguity of the majority's discussion. Certainly, Judge Wells' opinion is far crisper in rejecting the economic
substance doctrine than is the majority'S opinion. Indeed, the courts
have often been more reluctant to apply the economic substance
doctrine to federal transfer tax cases than to income tax cases, 178
even though that reluctance has hardly been absolute. 179 It is never
been apparent why this is so. The policies underlying the doctrine
- that structures and transactions should have an economic reality,
rather than just being tax gambits - would seem as applicable to
the federal transfer tax regime as to the income tax regime. The
dissents seemed to share this view. 180
Judge Parr wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Judges Beghe
and Marvel joined. 181 In the opinion, she complained that the facts
clearly demonstrated that the written partnership agreement had no
relationship to the reality of Strangi's ownership and control of the
assets contributed to the partnership.182 Judge Parr disagreed with
the majority's valuation, which assumed that the restrictions written
in the partnership agreement were actually binding on the partners.183 Even assuming that the partnership must be recognized for
federal estate tax purposes, Judge Parr would have valued the interest under the agreement that actually existed, which she felt permitted funds to be withdrawn at will rather than under the written partSee id.
See id. at 485.
178 See, e.g., Kohlsaat v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2732 (1997); Estate of
Cristofani v. Comm'r, 97 T.C. 74 (1991), acq. in result, 1992-1 C.B. 1 (Mar. 23,
1992).
179 See Heyen v. United States, 945 F.2d 359, 363 (10th Cir. 1991) (applying
the substance over form doctrine in the transfer tax context); Griffin v. United
States, 42 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703-704 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (same).
180 See Strangi, 115 T.C. at 495 (Parr, J.), 499-500 (Ruwe, J.), 504-505
(Beghe, J.).
181 See id. at 494, 496.
182 See id. at 494.
183 See id. at 494-95.
176

177
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nership agreement. 184 She argued, rather persuasively, that a minority-interest discount is premised on the fact that limited partners
cannot force the partnership to make distributions. 185 Yet Strangi
and his estate in fact caused the partnership to do so. A lack-ofmarketability discount is allowed because the third party would pay
less for the partnership interest than for the assets. 186 In Judge
Parr's view, however, under the actual facts, Strangi could have
distributed all the assets to himself and sold them directly to the
buyer, making the lack-of-marketability discount inappropriate. 187
Because the actual partnership arrangement provided for distributions at will, Judge Parr would have valued the partnership interest
at the value of the partnership assets without any discount. 188
In his dissent, Judge Ruwe accepted the Service's gift argu189
ment. If the partnership interest Strangi received is worth, as the
majority held, 31 % less than the value of the property that the decedent transferred, and was not transferred for a bona fide business
reason, then the difference should be a gift. 190 A literal reading of
the Code and regulations might support this view. 19l A stumbling
block for this position, however, is that, as the majority suggested,
nothing was really given away: Strangi retained almost all of the
partnership interests. 192 Judge Ruwe responded that it is not necessary to know who the donees are for the gift tax to apply. 193 That is
true under the treasury regulations,194 but historically, this rule has
been applied in cases such as Robinette v. Helvering,195 where a
remainder interest was given and the putative remaindermen, unborn children of the grantor, did not yet exist. 196 The difficulty with
See id.
See id. at 496.
186 See id.
187 See id.
188 See id.
189 See id. at 497.
190 See id. at 497 n.1.
191 See 1.R.e. §§ 2501, 2512(b). Section 2512 states, "[W]here property is
transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth, then the amount by which the value of the property exceeded the value of
the consideration shall be deemed a gift." I.R.C. § 2512(b).
192 See Strangi, 115 T.e. at 490,497 n.1.
193 See id. at 499.
194 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2.
195 318 U.S. 184 (1943).
196 See id. at 185-86.
184
185
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applying that principle to the facts of Strangi is that in Strangi the
donees were known. 197 Further, on formation of the partnership, the
children received virtually nothing, since Strangi retained almost all
of the interests. 198 To say there is a gift where the donor retains virtually all of the beneficial interests in the underlying property defies
common sense. Nevertheless, Judges Parr, Beghe, Gale and Marvel
joined this dissenting opinion in Strangi and would have recognized
a gift in such a situation. 199
,
, Judge Beghe, in addition to joining the dissents of others, wrote
a separate dissent. 200 He noted, no doubt correctly, that the only
reason for the formation of SFLP was to reduce the federal transfer
taxes by depressing the value of Strangi's assets. 201 The transactions did nothing to affect Strangi's or his children's interests in the
underlying assets; the control exercised by Strangi and his children
over the assets did not change. 202 For example, shortly after
Strangi's death, SFLP made substantial distributions to the children,
and the Merrill Lynch account was divided into four separate accounts to allow each child to control his or her proportionate share
of the SFLP assets. 203 Since the apparent intent was to transfer assets to the children, with SFLP only hopefully proving itself a federal transfer-tax-reducing way-station, Judge Beghe would have
applied the step transaction doctrine to collapse the steps and treat
the transfer as going from Strangi directly to his children, eliminating any SFLP-related valuation discounts. 204 Judge Beghe's reasoning seems cogent. However, it would be fairly easy to plan around
this simply by leaving assets in FLLE solution for longer periods of
time and limiting the control exercised by the transferor. The proposal discussed below would apply more widely and uniformly,
while avoiding the abuse Judge Beghe correctly identified. 2os

197
198
199

200
201
202
203
204
205

See Strangi, 115 T.e. at 482-83.
See id. at 481,490.
See id. at 500.
See id.
See id. at 502.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 503, 505-506.
See infra Part V.
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IV. THE POSSmLE APPLICATION OF SECTION 2036

Section 2036 provides that the estate of a decedent includes
transferred property if the decedent retained possession or enjoyment of the property or the right to the income from the property,
excluding transfers for adequate consideration. 206 Further, section
2036 provides that the estate includes all assets that the decedent
has trimsferred while retaining the right to designate who shall possess or enjoy the associated property or income. 207 Given the control Strangi effectively retained, both of these provisions of section
2036 could have applied in the case, had the Service asserted them
in a timely manner. 208 Both Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner09 and Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner21O shed light on
this issue. 211
Schauerhamer involved a widow who took control of a family
building-material business after her husband's death. 212 In November 1990 she was diagnosed with colon cancer. She then retained an
attorney to assist with her estate planning. 213 Three limited partnerships were formed, one for each of her three children. 214 She and an
alternate child were the general partners of each limited partnership.215 Mrs. Schauerhamer was also the sole initial limited partner
of each partnership as well as the managing partner of each partnership with full power to manage and conduct the respective partnership's affairs, and she did in fact manage each partnership. 216 In
1990 and 1991, Mrs. Schauerhamer transferred her business assets
in undivided one-third shares to the partnerships.217 In 1990, and
again in 1991, she assigned 33 limited partnership interests, each

206 See LR.C. § 2036(a)(I). The classic example: a decedent, while alive,
transfers her home to her children, but retains the right to live in it.
207 See LR.C. § 2036(a)(2).
208 See Strangi, 115 T.C. at 486-87.
209 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855 (1997).
210 114 T.e. 144.
211 See generally Howard M. Zaritsky, Back to Basics/or the Family Limited
Partnership, 27 EST. PLAN. 240 (2000).
212 See Schauerhamer, 73 T.e.M. (CCH) at 2856.
213 See id. at 2855-56.
214 See id. at 2856.
215 See id.
216 See id.
217 See id.
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purportedly worth $10,000, to family me~bers.218 Mrs. Schauerhamer deposited all partnership income into an account that she
held with a daughter-in-law and that she used as her personal
checking account. 219 She did not maintain any records to account
separately for partnership and nonpartnership funds. 22o
The court noted that the term "enjoyment" in section 2036221 is
not a term of art but is synonymous with substantial present economic benefit. 222 Retained enjoyment may exist where there is an
express or implied understanding at the time of the transfer that the
transferor will retain the economic benefits of the property.223 The
court concluded that there was such an implied agreement among
the partners. 224 Notwithstanding that each partnership agreement
required each partnership to maintain a separate bank account and
that partnership income be deposited in it, the partnership income
was deposited in an account Mrs. Schauerhamer used as a personal
checking account, where it was commingled with funds from other
sources?25 Further, her relationship to the assets did not change
before or after the transfer. 226 As a consequence, the court held that
section 2036( a)( 1) required inclusion of the partnership assets in her
estate. 227
Reichardt'involved the estate of Charles Reichardt, who had
inherited from his wife a life interest in her separate property along
with the power, on terms he deemed advisable, to sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of any of that froperty without requiring him to account for or replace any of it. 28 In 1993, Reichardt was diagnosed

218 See id. at 2856-57. These transfers, if correctly valued, would be exempt
from gift tax under the $10,000 annual exclusion contained in section 2503. See
I.R.C. § 2503(b).
219 See Schauerhamer, 73 T.e.M. (CCH) at 2857.
220 See id.
221 See 1.R.e. § 2036(a)(1).
222 See Schauerhamer, 73 T.e.M. (CCH) at 2857.
~23 See id.
224 See id.
225 See id. at 2857-58.
226 See id. at 2858.
227 See id. at 2857-58.
228 See 114 T.C. at 145-47. He would lose the life estate ifhe remarried. His
wife was apparently upset about an extramarital affair that he had been having,
and this provision was apparently an effort from the grave to control his behavior, or failing that, his marital status. See id. at 146.
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with terminal cancer.229 In June of that year, on the advice of his
son and a CPA, Reichardt signed a will and durable power of attorney, and formed a revocable living trust and a family limited partnership.230 The trust was the general partner of the limited partnership, Reichardt and his children were trustees of the trust, and each
was authorized to act on behalf of the truSt. 231 Reichardt was entitled to the net income of the trust and could use the corpus of the
trust for his support, maintenance, health, and general welfare. 232
Reichardt placed almost all of his property in the partnership, including his home. 233 He transferred a 30.4% interest in the partnership to each of his two children, claiming a gift tax value of
$310,000. 234 The court noted that Reichardt controlled and managed, or allowed the co-owners to control and manage, the partnership assets in the same manner both before and after his transfer of
them to the partnership. 235
The court stated that for purposes of section 2036, a transferor retains the enjoyment of property if there is an express or implied agreement at the time of the transfer that the transferor will
retain present economic benefits of the property, even if the retained right is not legally enforceable. 236 The court held that Reichardt did not curtail his enjoyment of the transferred property after
he formed the partnership.237 Nothing changed except legal title: he
managed the trust, which managed the partnership; he commingled
partnership and personal funds. 238 The court also concluded that
there was an implied agreement between Reichardt and his children
that he could retain the right to make income from the transferred
property.239 The court held that since Reichardt's relationship to the
assets remained the same before and after the transfer, section
See ill. at 147.
See ill. at 147-48.
231 See ill. at 147.
232 See ill. at 147-48.
233 See ill. at 148.
234 See ill. at 148-50.
235 See ill. at 149.
236 See ill. at 151.
237 See ill. at 152.
238 See id.
239 See id. at 153, 155, 158-59. Reichardt did not retain the right to earn income from the home, but since he continued to live in it, he retained possession
and enjoyment of it, which is one of the standards for triggering section
2036(a)(1). See ill. at 152.
229

230
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2036(a)(1) required the assets to be included in his estate?40 The
estate claimed that Reichardt formed the partnership to prevent him
from treating the transferred property imprudently. 241 The court
rejected this argument since he stayed in effective control. 242 The
estate also contended that Reichardt's fiduciary duties as a general
partner and trustee precluded him from retaining enjoyment of the
assets. 243 The court also rejected this argument given the effective
control Reichardt in fact maintained and the implied agreement that
the court found to exist between him and his children. 244
What the Reichardt and Schauerhamer cases demonstrate,
and the Strangi case might have demonstrated but for the Service's
failure to raise the section 2036 issue in a timely manner, is that
sloppy procedures invite trouble. Donors cannot commingle funds
and maintain precontribution use of the property and then expect
supposed transfers to keep the property out of their estates. This
makes it obviously unwise to put purely personal-use assets such as
the family home into an FLLE. The decedent's use of FLLE assets
for personal purposes might not only trigger section 2036, but also
might raise questions as to whether there is an adequate business
purpose for the transfer. 245
Nevertheless, avoiding section 2036 should not be difficult
for FLLEs formed shortly before death. Personal-use assets should
not be included, and proper procedures should be followed. Obviously, partnership and personal funds should not be commingled. In
Schauerhamer and Reichardt, the courts stated that section 2036
could be applied if there were an express or implied agreement that
the decedent retain the economic benefits from the contributed
property.246 A decedent could avoid this problem simply by giving
up much of the benefits associated with the contributed property.
He could contribute the property to the FLLE and give a significant
portion of the FLLE interests to family members. To avoid a Reichardt situation, the decedent should not disproportionately benefit
from the FLLE assets. The transfers would be subject to a gift tax,
240
241
242
243
244
245
246

151.

See id at 152-53.
See id at 153.
See id
See id. at 154.
See id. at 153-55.
See supra Part II.A.
See Schauerhamer, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2857; Reichardt, 114 T.C. at
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even though the application of the annual exclusion and the applicable exclusion amounts could limit the amount of taxes that actually has to be paid. 247 Further, since gift taxes paid within three
years of death are brought back to the estate, these near-death transfers would not be "gift-tax exclusive.,,248 These results will often be
small prices to pay, however, for significant valuation discounts on
the property contributed to the FLLE, should the reasoning of
Strangi hold true. Further, with the decedent near death, paying gift
taxes currently may not pose a large time-value-of-money concern,
since an estate tax liability presumably would have applied regardless to the gifted property in the short run.
While it would reduce the likelihood of the Service's attack
if the decedent does not control the FLLE in her capacity as a general partner or managing member, the decedent can retain such control as long as she also retains typical state-law fiduciary duties to
the other owners. The application of those fiduciary duties will prevent the general partner from disproportionately benefiting from the
FLLE assets. The Service has frequently ruled that the fiduciary
duties to which a general partner is subject will prevent section
2036 from applying to business property contributed by the general
partner to a limited partnership.249 Of course, the fiduciary duties
have to be real: a private agreement obviating otherwise applicable
state-law fiduciary duties would run afoul of Reichardt.
Additionally, gifting away interests in the FLLE to other family
members may pose psychological problems. Many resist yielding
absolute control until they breathe their last breath. Many also fear
giving up the assets they might need to endure the fmal stages of
life. For those of moderate wealth, this latter point may be more
than just a psychological concern and, indeed, may be a valid reason to minimize transfers. Taxpayers with substantial wealth, however, can transfer substantial assets without this .concern. They will
typically have assets for which they have no direct need and that
See I.R.C. § 2503(b). See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
See I.R.C. § 2035(b). Gift taxes paid more than three years before death
are "gift-tax exclusive," meaning that the gift taxes are paid from other assets of
the donor, further reducing the size of the donor's estate. Estate taxes are never
"exclusive," since the estate taxes are paid from the assets of the taxable estate.
See 1.R.c. § 2001(a);
249 See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9546007 (Nov. 17, 1995); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
9546006 (Nov. 17, 1995); HENKEL, supra note 2, § 16.03[4]. Accord United
States v. Byrumf, 408 U.S. 125, 137-38 (1972).
247
248
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can be contributed to the FLLE. If they are willing to put aside any
psychological limitations and either give up control or retain relevant fiduciary duties, section 2036 should not pose a problem, and
substantial assets can be transferred close to the time of death at
reduced gift tax cost after the application of valuation discounts as
seemingly sanctioned by Strangi.
While the court's interpretation of section 2036 in Reichardt is
admittedly reasonable, the policy support is questionable. Effectively, the court's holding imposes a limitation on those of moderate wealth who have legitimate concerns about retaining enough
assets to get through the fmal stages of life. Those with more substantial wealth can readily fund the partnership with appropriate
assets and follow appropriate procedures. It is not apparent why the
latter group should be preferred to the former. Finally, section 2036
in this context is an invitation to litigation, since it forces one to ask
difficult questions. Did the decedent really give up control or, as
was likely in Strangi, did he merely give up the appearance of control while maintaining control in fact, thereby triggering section
2036? Have state-law fiduciary duties been subverted by a private
agreement by the parties to favor the decedent? My proposal, discussed below, would both apply more neutrally and provide an unambiguous standard that would not invite undue litigation.

v.

PRoPOSAL FOR REFORM

It is hardly good tax policy to allow taxpayers in the last
hours of life to place their assets in an essentially artificial structure
and thereby significantly reduce federal transfer taxes. In longerstanding FLLEs, taxpayers typically make gifts of FLLE interests to
the next generation and argue for minority-interest and lack-ofmarketability discounts on those gifts. Here the Service has also
resisted taxpayers' arguments. 250 While a full discussion of whether
taxpayers should ever be allowed to use FLLEs to reduce federal
transfer taxes is beyond the scope of this article, I would note that
the argument for discounts for such longer-standing FLLEs is at
least stronger. One cannot always assume, for example, that doneesiblings will have amicable relations and act jointly. As a result of
the gifts to the next generation, the interests in the FLLE may be
250 See, e.g., Jones, 116 T.e. 121; Knight, 115 T.e. 506; Harper, 79 T.e.M.
(CCH) 2232; Kerr, 113 T.C. 449.
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spread out among a number of members of the family. After the
gifts are made, someone who wants to buy all the FLLE assets may
have to negotiate with a number of underlying owners. 251 One family member's FLLE interest may indeed be worth far less than the
proportional share of the fair market value of the underlying assets.
But in an FLLE formed shortly before death, the situation is very
different.
In these near-death transactions, beneficial ownership typically stays primarily with the decedent, so the diversity of interests
that can justify discounts usually is lacking. Of course, significant
beneficial ownership in the FLLE could be transferred to others.
Given the proximity of death, there would likely be no federal
transfer tax benefit beyond the discounts. Gift taxes paid within
three years of death are included in the estate?52 Values of the
property are unlikely to change between the time of the contribution
and the time of death, and the unified gift and estate tax system
adds gifts made during life and after death together to compute the
transfer tax?53 Transferring interests to others proved effective in
Frank. 254 Such transfers of FLLE interes!s to others, however,
would not seem to provide an intelligent basis for differing tax
treatment. All that is likely involved is a last-minute artifice without
any genuine economic substance. Even estranged family members
probably will fmd a way to get along, considering the desire to obtain the discounts and the short period of time until the decedent
dies upon which the FLLE is possibly dissolved and its assets distributed.
One avenue of attack is section 2036, but, as noted above,255 its
application would not be difficult to avoid for wealthier decedents
who have assets for which they have no fmancial need. To avoid
section 2036, they simply need to avoid transferring personal-use
assets to the FLLE, gift away meaningful amounts of the FLLE interests, and exercise whatever control they retain through the FLLE
in a fiduciary capacity. Section 2036 does not always provide a reliable bright line test, and accordingly, faGtual disputes could arise
251 The Uniform LLC Act requires the consent of all members to a sale of all
or substantially all of the assets of an LLC. See UNIF. LTD. LIABILITY COMPANY
ACT § 404(c)(l2), 6A U.L.A. 458 (1995).
252 See 1.R.c. § 2035(b).
253 See 1.R.c. § 2001(b).
254 See 69 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2256-57,2259,2263.
255 See supra Part I V .
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as to whether the decedent is adhering to his fiduciary duties and/or
receiving a disproportionate benefit.
Another option would be to apply some form of familyattribution rules and ignore the FLLE wrapper when the FLLE is
controlled by family members. While this approach would be effective in stopping many abuses, it would be much broader than
needed to address the abuse of last-minute FLLEs. For longerstanding FLLEs, one cannot assume family members will have
amicable relations or readily come to agreement on when and
whether to sell the underlying assets. Thus, in this context minorityinterest and lack-of-marketability discounts for the diversely held
interests of family members often are justifiable and represent economic reality. That fact would make it politically difficult to craft a
rule that always ignores the FLLE wrapper for family-controlled
FLLEs. The Clinton Administration's unsuccessful efforts to make
a frontal assault on FLLEs are instructive in this regard. 256
A more focused approach, and one that would be easy to
administer, would be to bring transfers of property to FLLEs within
the scope of section 203~. 257 Under this approach, any contributions
made to a farriily-controlled FLLE by a decedent within three years
of death would be a nonevent for Federal estate tax purposes?58
The property transferred, and not the associated FLLE interests,
would be included in the decedent's estate. Another concern is that
a decedent could operate an FLLE as the primary owner for a prolonged period. Then, in an attempt to obtain increased valuation
discounts, the decedent could transfer control of the FLLE at the
256 The Clinton administration had on several occasions proposed that transfers of interests in FILEs be subject to a valuation discount only if the entity is
engaged in an active trade or business. The Clinton Administration had no success with its proposals. See, e.g., Congo Budget Office, 106th Cong., Analysis of
the President's Budgetary Proposals for FY2001, 93218 (Comm. Print 2000);
H.R. Rep. No. 106-658, Providing for the Consideration of H.R. 8, The Death
Tax Elimination Act of 2000, at 8-10 (Comm. Print 1998); Congo Budget Office,
105th Cong., Analysis of the President's Budgetary Proposals for FY99, 93212
(Comm. Print 1998).
257 Currently, section 2035 requires inclusion in the decedent's estate gift
taxes paid within three years of death and transfers made within three years of
death which, if they had not been made, would have resulted in the transferred
property being included in the estate under sections 2036 through 2038, or 2042.
See 1.R.c. § 2035.
258 This rule, of course, would not apply to the extent the decedent is paid
fair value (in other than FILE interests) for the property transferred.
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end of her life. To counter this strategy, under this proposal any
transfers of FLLE interests in a family-controlled FLLE made
within three years of death would also be ignored, and the transferred interests would be included in the decedent's estate. This
latter part of the rule would effectively codify Murphl 59 and overrule Frank.260 As section 2001 already provides, credit will be
given against the estate tax for any gift tax paid on the lifetime
transfers. 261 Under these rules, if a decedent contributes property to
a family-controlled FLLE within three years of death, and also
transfers FLLE interests within that time period, the following
would occur: the property transfers would be ignored, and the property would be included in the decedent's estate; the FLLE interests
would also be included in the decedent's estate, but they would be
valued as if the ·FLLE did not hold the property that was pulled
back into the decedent's estate.
An FLLE for these purposes would include a limited partnership, LLC, or S-corporation. An S-corporation is an unlikely
vehicle for this type of planning, because the gain is recognized
when an S-corporation distributes appreciated property to a shareholder. 262 Nevertheless, like limited partnerships and LLCs, Scorporations typically impose a single level of taxation on income
at the owner level and could conceivably be used in a manner comparable to limited partnerships and LLCs. S-corporations are included in the proposal to make sure the door to this type of abuse is
fully shut. The double-tax burden of C-corporations would make
them an inappropriate vehicle for such last-minute planning,263and
thus they would not be included in the defmition of an FLLE.
For section 2035 to apply under this proposal, the beneficial
ownership of the transferred assets or FLLE interests must stay with
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Murphy, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645.
Frank, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2255. See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying

text.
See I.R.C. § 2001(b).
See I.R.C. § 311(b).
263 C-corporations are subject to two levels of taxation, one at the corporate
level and another at the shareholder level, when corporate income is distributed
to shareholders as dividends. See I.R.C. §§ 11, 301, 316. Further, distributions of
appreciated property by a C-corporation cause gain to be recognized by the corporation, and the shareholder receiving the property as a dividend has ordinary
income to the extent of the fair market value of the property. See 1.R.c. §§ 301,
311(b).
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the decedent or within the decedent's family and the decedent's
family needs to control the FLLE. Since section 2701 provides rules
often relevant for valuing FLLEs, it would seem an appropriate
place to look for a definition of "family" for these purposes. Section
2701 defines "family" to include the transferor; the. transferor's
spouse; a lineal descendant of the transferor or the transferor's
spouse, and the spouse of any such descendant; the definition also
includes an ancestor of the transferor or the transferor's spouse, and
the spouse of any such ancestor. 264 This excludes collaterals such as
uncles and nephews; but such persons are less likely to be involved,
and a defmition of family already in use in a related area is more
likely to fmd acceptance than would a more expanded definition.
Similarly, for purposes of determining whether the family controls
the FLLE, the definition of control contained in section 2701 could
be used. 265 That section defmes control for partnerships (including
LLCs taxed as partnerships) as the holding of at least 50% of the
capital or profit interests in the partnership.266 In the case of a limited partnership, control is defined as the holding of any general
partnership interest by a family member. 267 For corporations, control means the holding of at least 50% by vote or value of the stock
of the corporation. 268
While even those transfers made more than three years before
death may involve the hopes of eventual estate tax savings, the
structure is far more likely to bear the markings of legitimacy.
Typically, the transferor after the formation of the FLLE will transfer interests to others, providing legitimate dispersion of interests.
Section 2036 would still be available to attack transactions where
the transferor keeps undue control and benefit. Further, the passage
of three years at least suggests that the structure has some significant economic reality.
One potential, although inferior, option would be to apply, in
addition to the three-year provision, a rule actually requiring a decedent to transfer to others some minimum amount of interest in the
FLLE for the FLLE wrapper to be respected. For example, perhaps
a minimum of 20% of the interests would need to be transferred to
264
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See I.R.C. § 2701(e)(1), (2).
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others more than three years before death, or all of the interests held
by the decedent would be valued without the FLLE wrapper. This
approach would not be indefensible, and would help insure that
there is substance to the FILE, rather than simply approximating an
alter ego of the decedent. Such a rule, however, would break a fundamental, and too often violated, principle of tax legislation: the tax
system should only address problems that are, or are likely to be,
reasonably widespread. Given the need to transfer assets to the
FLLE three years before death and the risk of the applications of
section 2036 in any event, the vast majority of taxpayers will in fact
make appropriate transfers of FLLE interests to others. Therefore,
there is little need to craft a rule for situations in which this does not
occur, and our already Byzantine tax code does not need more provisions of only limited application.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is not difficult to understand the frustration of the Service

and most of the judges in the Strangi case. 269 The creation of
FLLEs near the time of the death of the decedent usually involves
no more than a naked artifice designed to reduce transfer taxes.
Normally, these FLLEs have little economic substance or nontax
business ptirpose. Yet the current tax code does not provide a ready
touchstone from which to address the problem. Amending section
2035 to apply a three-year rule to FLLEs formed near the time of
death would provide a straightforward solution to the problem, and
would also make the rule easier to administer without unduly infringing upon the legitimate use of FLLEs.
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